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DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND
ORDINARY BUSINESS EXPENSES:
A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIVERSAL
STANDARD
The Internal Revenue Code' draws a distinction between ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses, which are currently de-
ductible from gross income, and capital expenditures, which, if
deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life of the
particular asset.2 Code section 162 allows a taxpayer to deduct
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business.3 To qualify as a section 162 deduction, the
expense must be both "ordinary" and "necessary" and must
bear a direct relation to the specific business.4 The principal
function of the term "ordinary" is to clarify the distinction be-
tween those expenses that are currently deductible and those
that are in the nature of capital expenditures. Code section 263
specifically applies to capital expenditures6 and denies a current
deduction for expenses incurred in the acquisition or improve-
1. Title 26 of the United States Code. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations are to
the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) of 1954, as amended.
2. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
3. I.R.C. § 162(a) provides in part: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business ......
4. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971);
Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 470 (1943), superseded by statute as stated in
Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120, 1122 n.5 (6th Cir.
1984); Commissioner v. Polk, 276 F.2d 601, 602-03 (10th Cir. 1960); Hotel Kingkade v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950).
5. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
6. I.R.C. § 263(a) provides in part: "No deduction shall be allowed for- (1) Any
amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate."
Section 263 represents a specific exception to the set of deductions authorized by
§ 162. See I.R.C. § 161 ("In computing taxable income .... there shall be allowed as
deductions the items specified in this part [sections 161 to 196], subject to the exceptions
provided in part IX (sec. 261 and following, relating to items not deductible)."). See also
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 17 (1974); Blitzer v. United States, 684
F.2d 874, 892-93 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604,
606 (Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979).
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ment of a capital asset.7 As the Supreme Court has explained,
section 263 "serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing cur-
rently a deduction properly attributable, through amortization,
to later tax years when the capital asset becomes income
producing."'
Distinguishing ordinary and necessary business expenses from
capital expenditures has proven to be a difficult task for the
courts. Although a variety of line-drawing criteria have devel-
oped to deal with the problem,9 the circuit courts have yet to
apply a common standard. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings
& Loan Association,10 the Supreme Court declared that any ex-
penditure that, in addition to providing a future benefit beyond
the taxable year, creates or enhances a separate and distinct ad-
ditional asset must be capitalized." The circuits, however, have
used this standard as a mere threshold before applying addi-
tional criteria."5 Furthermore, several circuits have split in their
7. Examples of capital expenditures include:
(a) The cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery
and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and similar property having a useful life
substantially beyond the taxable year.
(b) Amounts expended for securing a copyright and plates, which remain the
property of the person making the payments.
(c) The cost of defending or perfecting title to property.
(h) The cost of good will in connection with the acquisition of the assets of a
going concern is a capital expenditure.
Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (1958).
8. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); see also Ellis Banking
Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379-80 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1207 (1983); Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.)
(capitalization is required to match income with its related expenses), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68, reaff'd, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965), overruled
on other grounds, NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); Note, Tax
Treatment of Prepublication Expenses of Authors and Publishers, 82 MICH. L. REv. 537,
539-40 (1983).
9. See infra notes 22-128 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Income
Tax-Costs of Expanding an Existing Business: Current Deductions Versus Capital
Expenditures-North Carolina National Bank Corp. v. United States, 18 WAKE FoREST
L. REV. 1127, 1130-39 (1982).
10. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
11. Id. at 354; cf. United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310 (1972)
(applying only a future benefit test).
12. See, e.g., Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120, 1124
(6th Cir. 1984) ("Whether an expenditure is 'normal' or 'habitual' is a criterion to be
used in determining whether it is currently deductible, or whether it must be capital-
ized."); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir.
1982) ("The distinction between recurring and nonrecurring business expenses provides
a very crude but perhaps serviceable demarcation between those capital expenditures
that can feasibly be capitalized and those that cannot be."); NCNB Corp. v. United
States, 684 F.2d 285, 290, 292-93 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (expenditures for the continu-
ation or expansion of an existing business are currently deductible; the taxpayer's
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application of line-drawing criteria to particular expenditures. 13
It is apparent from an examination of the various court deci-
sions that there is no single, common standard used to distin-
guish between capital expenditures and ordinary business ex-
penses. The courts are not completely to blame for this
situation, however, because the Internal Revenue Code provides
little guidance on the capital/ordinary distinction.14 This Note
proposes an amendment to the Tax Code that would provide
courts with a universal standard to apply in differentiating be-
tween the two types of expenditures and that best reflects the
general purpose of the Code in matching income with its related
expenses. 15 Part I analyzes the historical development of the
capital/ordinary distinction and the various line-drawing tests
that are currently applied by the courts. Part II proposes a Tax
Code framework for distinguishing between capital and ordinary
expenditures. Part III applies this framework to two instances in
which courts have disagreed about the deductibility of certain
method of accounting is controlling if it clearly reflects income); Colorado Springs Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 1974) ("We find no statutory,
regulatory, or decisional test which is dispositive. The issue must be determined on the
facts presented in the novel situation before us.").
In Bonaire Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 679 F.2d 159, 161 (9th Cir. 1982), the court
ignored the "separate and distinct asset" standard of Lincoln Savings and applied only a
future benefit test.
13. Compare NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding
that a national bank's expenditures in connection with its establishment of a state-wide
network of branch banks are currently deductible), with Central Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that expenditures made in inves-
tigating and establishing new branches of a savings and loan association must be capital-
ized); compare Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1982) and Faura v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849 (1980) (holding that expenditures made by taxpayer in his
trade or business of being an author, in connection with the writing of a book, are cur-
rently deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses), with Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that payments
made by an encyclopedia company to another company to do all necessary research work
and to prepare and edit a natural science dictionary must be capitalized as expenditures
for the acquisition of an asset).
14. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-1, T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51, 52, 1.263(a)-i (1958), and 1.461-
1(a), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 218, are helpful but are rarely followed by the courts; cf.
Faura v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849, 851 (1980) (citing, but not following, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.461-1(a)). See also Note, supra note 8, at 543-44.
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. One might argue that a universal stan-
dard would be inappropriate because the capital/business expense distinction is typically
very fact-sensitive. See Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185,
1192 (10th Cir. 1974). This Note contends, however, that a universal standard for classi-
fying an expense as either capital or ordinary is clearly feasible and could be applied to
any corporate expenditure. Furthermore, the need for consistency among the circuits
weighs heavily in favor of a single standard. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying
text. Factual considerations will, of course, be important in the application of any
standard.
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expenditures: prepublication expenses of authors and publish-
ers 6 and bank branching expenses. 7
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITAL/ORDINARY
DISTINCTION
Section 263 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195418 disallows a
current deduction for any expenditure related to the creation,
acquisition, or improvement of a capital asset."9 The nondeduct-
ibility of capital expenditures can be traced back to the income
tax provisions enacted by Congress during the United States
Civil War;20 similar provisions have been adopted in every major
income tax statute since that time.2' Inevitably, the courts de-
veloped various line-drawing criteria to determine whether a
specific expenditure should be classified as a currently deducti-
ble business expense or as a nondeductible capital expense.
A. "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expenses
The distinction between capital and ordinary expenditures
can be based on either the definition of "business expense" or on
the definition of "capital expense. "22 In Welch v. Helvering,23
16. Section 905 of the Tax Reform Act of 1985, H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Act of 1985], could settle the dispute over pre-
publication expenses. Yet nothing in the Act addresses or changes the general thesis of
this Note. See infra note 179.
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 6.
19. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)(A)-(H) notes several exceptions to this general rule. I.R.C.
§ 1221 defines "capital asset." Note, however, that an expenditure need not be described
as a capital asset in § 1221 to be classified as a capital expenditure. Georator Corp. v.
United States, 485 F.2d 283, 285 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974), super-
seded, NCNB Corp v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982). See also Briarcliff
Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 786 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[Tlhe words ['capital
asset'] must be taken in their usual and customary business sense as items of ownership
of a permanent or fixed nature which are convertible into cash.").
20. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281-82 (1864): "[N]o deduction
shall be made for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent improvements, or
betterments, made to increase the value of any property or estate."
21. See generally J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAX LAws-1938-1861 (1938).
22. See Note, supra note 8, at 540-49. Thus, a court can apply either I.R.C. § 162 or
§ 263 to classify an expenditure. Classification under one of these provisions precludes
classification under the other. A court would, however, have to apply both provisions to
an expenditure having dual purposes (both capital and current). See Blitzer v. United
States, 684 F.2d 874, 893 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
23. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
SPRING 1986] Capital Expenditures
the Supreme Court ruled that payments of a bankrupt corpora-
tion's debts, made by a former officer to strengthen his own
standing and credit, were in the nature of nondeductible capital
expenditures.24 The Court applied the "ordinary and necessary"
expense standard of section 162 (formerly section 23) to con-
clude that the particular expenditures were not currently de-
ductible.2 5 In achieving this result, Justice Cardozo defined a
''necessary" expense as one that is "appropriate and helpful" to
the development of the taxpayer's business. 26 The definition of
"ordinary" posed greater difficulties for the Court.27 Neverthe-
less, in Deputy v. du Pont,2s "ordinary" was defined as invoking
24. Id. at 112, 115.
25. Id. at 115.
26. Id. at 113; see also Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966). To deter-
mine what is "appropriate and helpful," courts will generally defer to the business judg-
ment of the taxpayer. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. at 113 ("[W]e should be slow to
override [the businessman's] judgment."); see also Note, supra note 8, at 541 n.28.
Note that the characterization of an expense as "necessary" does not end the inquiry:
"Many necessary payments are charges upon capital. There is need to determine
whether they are both necessary and ordinary." Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. at 113
(emphasis added); see also Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345,
352 (1971).
27. Justice Cardozo wrote at length on the elusiveness of the term "ordinary" as con-
tained in I.R.C. § 162:
Now, what is ordinary, though there must always be a strain of constancy within
it, is none the less a variable affected by time and place and circumstance. Ordi-
nary in this context does not mean that the payments must be habitual or nor-
mal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often. A lawsuit
affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime.... [T]he ex-
pense is an ordinary one because we know from experience that payments for
such a purpose, whether the amount is large or small, are the common and ac-
cepted means of defense against attack. ... The situation is unique in the life of
the individual affected, but not in the life of the group, the community, of which
he is a part. At such times there are norms of conduct that help to stabilize our
judgment, and make it certain and objective. The instance is not erratic, but is
brought within a known type.
•.. Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, the decisive distinc-
tions are those of degree and not of kind. One struggles in vain for any verbal
formula that will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute
is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply
the answer to the riddle.
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. at 113-15.
Neither I.R.C. § 162 nor the accompanying Treasury regulations provide a definition
for "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. However, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
PUBLICATION 535-BusNzss EXPENSEs 23,351 (Rev. Dec. 1985), the Department of the
Treasury declared: "An ordinary expense is one that is common and accepted in your
field of business, trade, or profession. A necessary expense is one that is helpful and
appropriate for your trade, business, or profession. An expense does not have to be indis-
pensible to be considered necessary." (emphasis in original).
28. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
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"the connotation of normal, usual, or customary."2 The Court
held that the carrying charges on short sales of stock made by a
stockholder (taxpayer) to assist his corporation and preserve his
investment in it were not ordinary and necessary expenses of his
business.30 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority, set forth a general standard for determining
whether an expense is "ordinary" within the meaning of section
162: "[An expense may be ordinary though it happen but once
in the taxpayer's lifetime .... Yet the transaction which gives
rise to it must be of common or frequent occurrence in the type
of business involved."$'
The "recurrent in the industry" approach of du Pont3 2 was
utilized forty years later in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v.
Commissioner,sa a case dealing with the deductibility of prepub-
lication expenditures.3 4 Judge Posner defined an "ordinary" ex-
pense as one that is "normally incurred in the type of business
in which the taxpayer is engaged. 3 5 However, the court also fol-
lowed the trend of modern cases 6 by using the word "ordinary"
to clarify the distinction between currently deductible and capi-
tal expenditures.3 7 The continued ambiguity that resulted by
shifting the standard from "ordinary" to "recurrent" or "nor-
mal," and the judicial inclination to define section 162 expenses
by contrasting the definition of section 263 capital expenditures,
29. Id. at 495. After reciting Justice Cardozo's statement in Welch that what is ordi-
nary is "a variable affected by time and place and circumstance," see supra note 27, the
Court declared: "One of the extremely relevant circumstances is the nature and scope of
the particular business out of which the expense in question accrued.... It is the kind of
transaction out of which the obligation arose and its normalcy in the particular business
which are crucial and controlling." 308 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 488, 490-93. In addition, the Court concluded that the expenditures were
not incurred in connection with the taxpayer's alleged business of "conserving and en-
hancing his estate." The Court did not rule, however, on whether conserving and enhanc-
ing his estate constituted a "trade or business" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162 (for-
merly § 23). Because the carrying charges were found not to be an "ordinary"
expense-even assuming the activities of the taxpayer constituted a business-no such
ruling was required. Id. at 493-94.
31. Id. at 495 (emphasis added). Although the Court ruled that the expenditures were
not "ordinary," it declined to decide what treatment would be appropriate. Id. at 498-99.
Thus, it cannot be concluded that the carrying charges were capital expenditures within
the meaning of I.R.C. § 263.
32. See Note, supra note 8, at 541.
33. 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982).
34. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
35. 685 F.2d at 216.
36. See Note, supra note 8, at 541 n.31.
37. 685 F.2d at 216; see also Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
SPRING 1986] Capital Expenditures
led courts to apply line-drawing criteria based solely on the
meaning of the term "capital expenditure." 8
B. The Future Benefit or One-Year Test
In general, the future benefit or one year test requires the
capitalization of any expenditure that results in the creation of
an asset having a useful life substantially beyond the close of the
taxable year.39 This standard finds support in both the Treasury
regulations"0 and in the decisions of various circuit courts.41 Al-
though several early court decisions applied a future benefit test
in classifying corporate expenditures,42 United States v. Akin'3
is the case credited with first establishing the one-year test. 4 In
Akin, the Tenth Circuit held that an expenditure should be
treated as capital in nature "if it brings about the acquisition of
an asset having a period of useful life in excess of one year or if
it secures a like advantage to the taxpayer which has a life of
more than one year."'4 Although the one-year rule was valuable
in eliminating from capital treatment those expenditures that
38. See Note, supra note 8, at 541-43.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 218. An expenditure that
does not create an asset, but does secure for the taxpayer a like advantage that has a life
of more than one year, is also considered a capital expense within the standard. See
Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950). The underlying
objective of the future benefit test is to match revenue against the particular expenses
made to produce that revenue. See supra note 8.
40. See supra note 39. The federal income tax regulations are the official Treasury
Department interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code and follow the number se-
quence of the Code sections. 1 INCOME TAX REGULATIONS-FINAL AND PROPOSED As OF
JUNE 3, 1985 (CCH) 30,000.
41. See, e.g., Bonaire Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 679 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1982); Ameri-
can Dispenser Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1968); Sears Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966); Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345
F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68, original hold-
ing on this issue reaff'd, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965), overruled, NCNB Corp. v. United
States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
42. See, e.g., P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 269, 272 (4th Cir. 1946)
("The benefits to petitioner were to last over a period of several years .... "), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 838 (1947); Clark Thread Co. v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 257, 258 (3d
Cir. 1938) ("The benefits derived from this [asset] cannot be confined to the year in
which [it] was acquired .... ).
43. 248 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958).
44. See Note, supra note 9, at 1135.
45. 248 F.2d at 744 (citation omitted); see Note, supra note 9, at 1135. The expendi-
tures at issue in Akin were annual assessments paid by taxpayers to two mutual ditch
companies that supplied water for the irrigation of the taxpayers' farms and were used
by the companies to retire long-term indebtedness and to purchase a right of way. The
court held these expenditures to be nondeductible capital contributions.
The Tenth Circuit had previously delineated the one-year rule in Hotel Kingkade v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950).
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clearly provided no future benefits to the taxpayer,46 the fact
that many concededly deductible expenses have prospective ef-
fect beyond the taxable year led the Supreme Court to develop
additional criteria for distinguishing capital expenditures from
ordinary business expenses. 4 7
C. The Separate and Distinct Asset Test
In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association, 4
the Supreme Court held that the controlling consideration in
classifying an expenditure as capital or ordinary is whether the
"payment serves to create or enhance .. .what is essentially a
separate and distinct additional asset."49 The expenditure at is-
sue in Lincoln Savings was a mandatory "additional premium"
paid by a state-chartered savings and loan association into a
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) Sec-
ondary Reserve.50 The Court concluded that the premium pay-
ment represented a nondeductible capital expenditure because it
created a separate and distinct asset for the savings and loan
46. See Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395, 405 (4th Cir.) ("The one-
year rule is useful because it serves to segregate from all business costs those which can-
not possibly be considered capital in nature because of their transitory utility to the
taxpayer."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).
47. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971); NCNB
Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1982) ("One need not consider further
than the case of the corporate executive who spends a significant, though indetermin-
able, amount of his time on future planning to realize that universal application of the
one year rule is impossible and that it has not been so applied in such cases."); see also
infra notes 48-83 and accompanying text.
48. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
49. Id. at 354. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, declared:
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not
controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect be-
yond the taxable year.
What is important and controlling, we feel, is that the . . . payment serves to
create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and distinct addi-
tional asset and that, as an inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in
nature and not an expense, let alone an ordinary expense, deductible under
§ 162(a) in the absence of other factors not established here.
Id.
For a general discussion of Lincoln Savings and the "separate and distinct asset" test,
see Gunn, The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset,
15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443 (1974); Lee & Murphy, Capital Expenditures: A Re-
sult in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (1981); Note, Commissioner v.
Lincoln Savings & Loan Association: "Separate and Distinct Asset" as a Condition Suf-
ficient for Capitalization, 2 VA. TAx REv. 315 (1982); Note, supra note 9, at 1136-38.
50. 403 U.S. at 345, 349.
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association. 1 Although the premium payment provided a future
benefit to the taxpayer, and thus could be classified as a capital
expenditure under the one-year rule,5" the Court held that this
fact was not controlling.5 3
Since the Lincoln Savings decision, most courts have held the
future benefit aspect of an expenditure to be merely a factor for
consideration rather than a dispositive characteristic. 4 Accord-
ingly, the "separate and distinct asset" test has gained wide ac-
ceptance.6 6 In Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner," the
Second Circuit concluded that promotional expenses incurred by
the taxpayer in developing a new channel of distribution for its
products 7 did not create or enhance a separate and distinct cap-
ital asset.6 8 Thus, the expenditures were currently deductible as
51. Id. at 354. The Court cited two criteria supporting the existence of a separate and
distinct capital asset: (1) the taxpayer had a recognized property interest in the Second-
ary Reserve; and (2) the taxpayer accounted for the payments as an asset on its balance
sheet. Id. at 355-56. See also Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 611
(Ct. Cl. 1978) (holding that litigation expenses allocable to future income were deducti-
ble because no property interest was at stake); see infra notes 118-28 and accompanying
text.
52. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
53. 403 U.S. at 354; see supra note 49. But cf. United States v. Mississippi Chem.
Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310 (1972) ("Since the [asset] is of value in more than one taxable
year, it is a capital asset within the meaning of § 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, and
its cost is nondeductible.").
54. See, e.g., Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395, 404-05 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979); Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d
1185, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 1974); cf. Bonaire Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 679 F.2d 159, 161
(9th Cir. 1982) ("Under the 'one-year rule' ... an expenditure creating an asset with a
useful life beyond the taxable year of more than one year generally must be amortized.")
(citations omitted).
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Jack's Cookie Co., the "separate and distinct asset"
test of Lincoln Savings necessarily incorporates the one-year rule because "one integral
characteristic of the 'separate and distinct' asset which is 'created or enhanced' by the
outlay, is that it will serve the taxpayer in subsequent years." 597 F.2d at 405 (footnote
omitted).
55. See infra notes 56-83 and accompanying text.
56. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. The Briarcliff Candy Corp., formerly known as Loft Candy Corp., had engaged in
the manufacture and sale of confectionary products since the late 19th century. It made
over 80% of its sales through its own retail stores located in the thickly populated urban
centers of the Northeast. Yet the large shift in population from urban centers to the
suburbs which occurred in the 1950's severely affected Briarcliff's sales. The ."promo-
tional expenses" incurred by the taxpayer were made in order to persuade suburban
storekeepers to display and sell its products (in the form of a franchise). Id. at 777. Thus,
the taxpayer's purpose in making the expenditures was to maintain its sales and profits
by recapturing those customers who had moved to the suburbs. Id. at 780. See generally
Note, supra note 49, at 320-21.
58. 475 F.2d at 786-87. The court viewed the Lincoln Savings holding as applying
only to the creation or enhancement of a capital asset. Because the expenditures at issue
did not create or enhance "an item of ownership of a permanent or fixed nature which
[was] convertible into cash," the taxpayer was allowed to currently deduct the pay-
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ordinary and necessary business expenses within the meaning of
section 162. 51 The court reached its decision after analyzing the
distinction between intangible contributions to tangible assets
and intangible contributions to intangible assets.60 The court
reasoned:
[A]n intangible contribution to tangible assets, such as a
company's engineer's supervision of the construction of a
particular section of a new factory building, makes his
salary, or a proportionate part of it, a capital expenditure
connected with the building of the factory. If, however,
the sales manager of an ongoing concern has contributed
25% of his time to devising a new or different method of
attracting customers and selling candy, i.e. an intangible
asset to his company, the deductibility or non-deductibil-
ity of that 25% of his salary turns upon the question of
whether or not the new method is a capital asset and
therefore non-deductible. It is a capital asset if at the
time it is furnished to the company, it has an ascertaina-
ble and measurable value-that is, a value in money or a
fair market value[,] . . . so that [it is] no longer regarded
as an expense but as a distinct and recognized property
interest.6
The Briarcliff decision thus added an additional criterion to the
ments. Id. at 786. This narrow interpretation of Lincoln Savings resulted from the
court's reluctance to apply I.R.C. § 263 and the "separate and distinct asset" test to the
enhancement of an intangible asset (increased distribution and sales). Id. at 781, 783-85.
See also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
59. 475 F.2d at 787. The court believed that the facts of this case brought it
"squarely within the long recognized principle that expenditures for the protection of an
existing investment or the continuation of an existing business or the preservation of
existing income from loss or diminution, are ordinary and necessary within the meaning
of § 162 and not capital in nature." Id. (citations omitted). Because the expenditures
were ordinary recruiting costs of enlisting sales agents for a long-established concern and
seeking sales agents for its usual and customary product, they were currently deductible.
Id.
60. Id. at 784. According to the court, this distinction is important because an intan-
gible contribution to a tangible asset would almost always produce a capital expenditure,
though an intangible contribution to an intangible asset might not. See Note, supra note
9, at 1137; cf. Central Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1984) ("Even an intangible property right, such as the right to do business, may be a
capital item."); Seligman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 191, 202 (1985) (holding that expend-
itures that created a separate and distinct intangible asset-the legally enforceable right
to receive certain administrative services in the future-had to be capitalized).
61. 475 F.2d at 784-85 (emphasis in original and added). The court concluded that
the agreements between Briarcliff and the suburban storeowners provided no property
interest to the candy company. Therefore, no separate and distinct asset was created or
enhanced.
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Lincoln Savings standard: whether the asset that is created or
enhanced has an "ascertainable and measurable value."62
In NCNB Corp. v. United States," the Fourth Circuit applied
the "separate and distinct asset" test to expenditures incurred
by the North Carolina National Bank (NCNB) in connection
with its establishment of a state-wide network of branch
banks.6 4 The expenditures in question included the costs of
"metro studies," 65 "feasibility studies, ' 66 and applications to the
Comptroller of the Currency.6 7 After concluding that the costs
NCNB incurred in exploring branch expansion were analogous
to the costs in Briarcliff of developing a franchise network,6 8 the
court held that NCNB's expenditures did not create or enhance
a "separate and distinct additional asset."6 9 In Central Texas
62. Id. Following the court's reasoning, a tangible expenditure that created or en-
hanced a separate and distinct intangible asset with an unascertainable value would
have to be currently deducted even if it provided a future benefit to the taxpayer. One
commentator observed:
This definition [of a capital asset] seems inadequate as a means of resolving any
but the clearest cases. Many expenditures clearly capital-the cost of a non-
transferable license, or stock in a closely-held corporation, for example-produce
benefits no more susceptible to precise, valuation than benefits that are not as-
sets. Measurability of the benefits of an expenditure in terms of time may be
relevant in capitalization cases, but there is no reason why measurability in
terms of dollar value should determine whether a cost must be capitalized.
Gunn, supra note 49, at 498 (footnotes omitted).
63. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
64. Id. at 286. See generally Note, The Deductibility of Bank Branching Expendi-
tures: Central Texas Savings & Loan Association v. United States: A Weak Rebuttal to
NCNB Corp. v. United States, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 147 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Bank Branching Expenditures]; Note, supra note 49, at 324-30; Note, supra note 9, at
1139-44; Capital Expenditure or Ordinary Expense: A Fourth Circuit Prescription,
Fourth Circuit Review, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (1983).
65. "Metro studies were long range planning reports making recommendations and
plotting strategies for NCNB in various regions of North Carolina." 684 F.2d at 289.
66. Feasibility studies focused on particular proposed branch locations and evaluated
the economics of various options. Id.
67. Id. Applications to the Comptroller were for the statutorily required permission
for a nationally chartered bank to open branch offices. Costs incurred included the appli-
cation fee, staff time in preparation of the application, and legal fees and related ex-
penses connected with the prosecution of the application. Id. at 289-90.
68. Id. at 290. The court reasoned that because NCNB's expenditures were made in
order to develop and operate a state-wide network of branch banking facilities-a busi-
ness strategy that was necessary to maintain its competitive position in the indus-
try-they would be deductible under I.R.C. § 162 as "expenditures for the protection of
an existing investment, the continuation of an existing business, or the preservation of
existing income from loss or diminution." Id. (citing Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 475 F.2d at 787); see supra note 59.
69. 684 F.2d at 293. The court stated: "The branch has no existence separate and
apart from the parent bank; as a branch bank, it is not readily salable and has no market
value other than the real estate which it occupies and the tangible equipment therein."
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Savings & Loan Association v. United States,70 a Fifth Circuit
case with essentially the same facts as NCNB, the court reached
the opposite conclusion.7 1 The court declared that "[tihe charac-
ter of the item acquired determines the tax treatment of the ex-
penditures made to acquire it.''72 Because the savings and loan
association enjoyed a property interest in its branch of-
fices 73-an interest that was easily valued at the time each
branch was permitted to begin operations-the court found the
offices to be separate and distinct assets within the Lincoln Sav-
ings definition.7 " As such, the expenditures incurred in investi-
gating and in starting up new branch offices had to be capital-
ized. 75 Although it is difficult to reconcile the decisions in
Central Texas and NCNB given the considerable similarity in
their fact patterns, the Fifth Circuit's greater reliance on the fu-
ture benefit aspect of the expenditures, 76 and its view that the
deduction of the investigatory and start-up expenses was an in-
accurate reflection of the taxpayer's income,77 provide some ex-
planation for the discrepancy. 78
The "separate and distinct asset" test set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Lincoln Savings continues to be the predomi-
nant standard applied by courts in distinguishing capital ex-
penditures from ordinary business expenses. 79  Legal corn-
70. 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
71. The taxpayer made several expenditures in investigating and in starting up new
branch banks, including professional fees for economic research and analysis to deter-
mine the potential market at each location, and attorneys' fees and permit fees incident
to licensing the new locations. Id. at 1182.
72. Id. at 1184.
73. Id. at 1185. Central Texas's property interest included the separate right, ac-
quired by permit, to do business in a new territory, the right to receive new accounts for
new customers in a new market, and the right to challenge the entry of competitors into
the local market. Id.
74. Id. The court stated: "The taxpayer obtained a separate and identifiable business
right that was exercised in a separate office by a separate staff in an exclusive territory."
Id.
75. Id. For a criticism of the Central Texas decision, see Note, Bank Branching Ex-
penditures, supra note 64, at 155-61.
76. 731 F.2d at 1183, 1185.
77. Id.; see infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text; see also Note, Bank Branch-
ing Expenditures, supra note 64, at 158-59.
78. For a more detailed explanation of the divergence in results of NCNB and Cen-
tral Texas, see Note, Bank Branching Expenditures, supra note 64, at 147-50, 155-61.
Three significant factors included: (1) disparate views concerning the proper test for de-
termining what is an "ordinary business expense"; (2) different interpretations concern-
ing the relationship of Code § 195 (relating to the capitalization of start-up expendi-
tures) and § 162; and (3) the Fifth Circuit's emphasis on the separate, tangible
characteristics of a bank branch. Id. at 148, 150, 159.
79. See, e.g., Honodel v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
fiat investment fees paid by the taxpayer to an investment advisory service in connection
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mentators, however, have leveled sharp criticism against the
Lincoln Savings standard. 80 One commentator suggests that lim-
iting capitalization to costs that create or enhance a "separate
and distinct additional asset" might not satisfactorily explain
the kind of distinctions that seem desirable in cases such as
Briarcliff.81 In the case of contract rights, for example, "refine-
ments based on distinctions between direct and indirect pay-
ments for a contract and upon the nature of the rights granted
by the contract seem necessary. "82 Because the Lincoln Savings
standard is not deemed to be determinative of all capitalization
issues, it is best to view the "separate and distinct asset" test as
a condition sufficient for capitalization rather than as a univer-
sal test.83 Consequently, courts have applied additional line-
drawing criteria in the classification of expenditures.84
D. The New Business/Old Business Test
The new business/old business test maintains that a taxpayer
"has not 'engaged in carrying on any trade or business' within
the intendment of [Code] section 162(a) until such time as the
business has begun to function as a going concern and per-
form[s] those activities for which it was organized.""5 Conse-
quently, expenditures to start a new business require capitaliza-
tion, while expenditures restricted to the enterprise's old
business, even though to be conducted in a new manner, should
with particular real estate purchases were expenditures that served to create or enhance
a separate and distinct asset); Seligman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 191 (1985) (holding
that monthly payments for administrative services in connection with the leasing of com-
puter equipment were capital expenditures because the payments created a separate and
distinct asset-the legal right to receive future services).
The future benefit test is also applied as a necessary condition to capitalization under
the Lincoln Savings standard. See supra note 54.
80. See Gunn, supra note 49, at 496-98; Note, supra note 8, at 547; Note, supra note
49, at 333-35.
81. Gunn, supra note 49, at 496.
82. Id.
83. Note, supra note 49, at 334-35 ("Interpretation of Lincoln as a universal capitali-
zation test, requiring the presence of a separate and distinct asset, contravenes the goal
of our tax system to reflect income clearly."). See also Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co.
v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 225 (1985).
84. See infra notes 85-128 and accompanying text.
85. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (per curiam), original holding on this issue reaff'd, 354
F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965), overruled on other grounds, NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684
F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982). See generally Note, supra note 9, at 1132-35.
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be expensed.8 ' The standard was first applied in Richmond
Television Corp. v. United States.87 The taxpayer, incorporated
in 1952 to operate a television station, incurred staff training ex-
penses prior to receiving its Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) license.88 The court held the expenditures to be
nondeductible "pre-operating expenses" because Richmond
Television did not begin "carrying on any trade or business" un-
til receipt of its FCC license in 1956.89
In Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,90 the Second Cir-
cuit held that expenditures incurred in establishing a new
method for conducting an ongoing business were deductible
under section 162.91 The Tenth Circuit applied this rationale in
Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States92 to conclude
that start-up expenditures incurred incident to a bank's new
credit card system were currently deductible business ex-
penses. 3 The court stated:
The credit card system enables a bank to carry on an old
business in a new way. A new method is distinguishable
from a new business .... [Because] [t]he challenged ex-
86. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 956 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd en banc,
684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); see also I.R.C. § 195 (requiring the capitalization of start-
up expenditures).
87. 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (per curiam), origi-
nal holding on this issue reaff'd, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965), overruled on other
grounds, NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
88. 345 F.2d at 903-04.
89. Id. at 907. The court did not rule on whether the training expenses could be
amortized as capital expenditures. Id. at 908-09.
90. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
91. Id. at 782. The court stated:
Every new idea and every change of method in making sales, even in promoting
special sales or developing new sales territory, do not require that the expenses
connected with the operation be non-deductible under § 162. . . . In fact, ex-
penditures by an already established and going concern in developing a new
sales territory are deductible under § 162.
• . . [Tihe changes which [the taxpayer] made in its own internal organization
to spread its sales into a new territory were not comparable to the acquisition of
a new additional branch or division to make and sell a new and different product
[which would require capitalization].
Id. (citations omitted). See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
92. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
93. Id. at 1190-91; see also First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050
(9th Cir. 1979); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir.
1979); First Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977); Note,
supra note 9, at 1134-35. See generally Comment, Colorado Springs National Bank v.
United States-Deductibility of Start-Up Expenses for a Credit Card Program, 1975
UTAH L. REV. 279.
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penditures were for the continuation of an existing busi-
ness and for the preservation and improvement of ex-
isting income .... they were ordinary expenses.9"
In NCNB Corp. v. United States,95 the Fourth Circuit applied
the new business/old business standard in the context of bank
branching expenditures. Although the taxpayer had arguably
created a separate and distinct asset (the bank branch itself),9"
the court concluded that the expenditures were currently de-
ductible because they were incurred for the "continuation of an
existing business. 9 7
The new business/old business test is not the predominant
standard used by the courts to distinguish capital expenditures
from ordinary and necessary business expenses. 98 The test is
useful in those situations where a taxpayer incurs expenditures
unrelated to its normal business objectives. It must be recog-
nized, however, that an expenditure's relation to a new business
of the taxpayer is a sufficient but not necessary condition for
requiring capitalization;9 9 the new business/old business test
merely represents one of several standards that courts may
choose to apply.
94. 505 F.2d at 1190, 1193.
95. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
96. See Central Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that a bank branch was a separate and distinct asset).
97. 684 F.2d at 290; see also supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
99. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 957 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd en banc,
684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982). The panel decision of NCNB discussed at length the impli-
cations of the new business/old business standard:
When the costs at issue relate to a new business, income will almost certainly
be unclearly reflected if those costs are set off against revenues flowing from the
enterprise's old business.
Where the expenditure relates to the enterprise's old business, it may or may
not be appropriate to consider the expenditure as part of the cost of producing
current revenues. In some situations there may be a clear cause-and-effect rela-
tion between the expenditure on the old business and a future revenue stream
which has not yet begun to flow. If so, carrying forward and capitalizing the
costs is appropriate. In other situations, "no useful purpose" would be served by
allocating the costs to a subsequent period, or the costs "cannot, as a practical
matter, be associated with any other [than the current] period." If so, they
should be charged to current expense. ...
... It is the current or future nature of the matching income, not the newness
or non-newness of the business which controls. The test is simply not one of
whether the business is an old or a new enterprise. Relation to a new business of
the enterprise in question is thus a sufficient but it is not a necessary condition
for carrying a cost forward to subsequent accounting periods.
Id. at 956-57 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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E. The Origin-of-the-Claim Doctrine
Under the origin-of-the-claim doctrine, the basis for requiring
capitalization is the integral relationship between the expendi-
ture and a capital asset.100 Although the doctrine is theoretically
applicable to a variety of corporate expenditures,10 courts have
primarily used the origin-of-the-claim test to determine whether
litigation expenses should be capitalized or currently de-
ducted.1 02 Briefly stated, the test declares that legal expenses
must be capitalized if "the origin of the claim litigated is in the
process of acquisition [or disposition of a capital asset]. '"103 The
rationale for this standard "rests on the belief that all expenses
which stem from a capital transaction should ... be 'matched' or
equated with all gains from the same capital transaction and the
expenses should receive identical tax treatment as the gains."104
100. Lee & Murphy, supra note 49, at 484.
101. See, e.g., Honodel v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[T~he
deductibility of any expense [investment fees in this case] related to tax advice or assis-
tance must still turn on whether the origin of the tax-related expense was ordinary and
necessary, or was a capital acquisition or disposition."); Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v.
United States, 352 F. Supp. 1159, 1172 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (applying the origin-of-the-
claim test to payments by a corporate taxpayer to secure release from employment con-
tracts), aff'd in unpub. opinion, 505 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1974).
102. See, e.g., Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); United States v. Gil-
more, 372 U.S. 39 (1963); Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See
generally Lee & Murphy, supra note 49, at 484-99.
103. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970). In turn, legal expenses
would be currently deductible if incurred (1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the produc-
tion of income; or (3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any
tax. I.R.C. § 212. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (1957).
The application of the origin-of-the-claim test is still developing. In the context of
litigation, the Tax Court has held:
Quite plainly, the "origin-of-the-claim" rule does not contemplate a mechani-
cal search for the first in the chain of events which led to the litigation but,
rather, requires the examination of all the facts. The inquiry is directed to the
ascertainment of the "kind of transaction" out of which the litigation arose....
Consideration must be given to the issues involved, the nature and objectives of
the litigation, the defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deduc-
tions were expended, the background of the litigation, and all facts pertaining to
the controversy.
Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 713 (1973) (citations omitted); accord Estate of
Baier v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 513, 520 (1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1976). See
also Lee & Murphy, supra note 49, at 490-91.
104. Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976). According to Lee
and Murphy:
To allow a current deduction for such an expenditure while taxing related gain
from the capital asset as capital gain, unreduced for the expenditure, would dis-
tort the taxpayer's income through a double deduction, or at least a deduction
and a half (an ordinary deduction for the expenditure and a capital gain deduc-
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In Woodward v. Commissioner,10 5 the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the tax treatment of expenses incurred in certain appraisal
litigation.'"6 The taxpayers, majority stockholders of an Iowa
corporation, voted for perpetual extension of the corporate char-
ter, and under Iowa law became obligated to purchase at its
"real value" the stock of a minority shareholder who had voted
against the extension.107 Because the parties could not reach
agreement on the value of those shares, the taxpayers brought
an action in state court to appraise the mirrority interest.108 The
issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the litiga-
tion expenses incurred by the taxpayers 09 were deductible
under Code section 212 as "ordinary and necessary expenses
paid . . . for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income,"110 or were nonde-
ductible capital expenditures incurred in connection with the ac-
quisition of capital stock."' After stating that "costs incurred in
the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset are to be treated
as capital expenditures,"' 2 the Court applied the origin-of-the-
claim test to conclude that the litigation expenses were not
deductible."'
Closely linked to the origin-of-the-claim doctrine is the tax
benefit rule of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner."' As one pair of
tion on the gain under section 1202).... Expenditures which are integrally re-
lated to an income or loss item or transaction must possess the same character
for tax purposes as that item or transaction in order to prevent a distortion of
the taxpayer's income.
Lee & Murphy, supra note 49, at 484.
105. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
106. Id. at 573. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970), the com-
panion case to Woodward, also involved the tax treatment of legal expenses incurred
during stockholder appraisal litigation.
107. 397 U.S. at 572.
108. Id. at 573.
109. The taxpayers paid attorneys', accountants', and appraisers' fees of over $25,000
for services rendered in connection with the appraisal litigation. Id. at 573-74.
110. I.R.C. § 212. Whereas I.R.C. § 162 applies to business expenses incurred by cor-
porations, "§ 212 applies only to individuals, trusts, and estates, and is primarily con-
cerned with expenses attributable to marketable securities and other passive invest-
ments, such as the cost of investment advice and custodial services." 1 B. BrrrKEE,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS 1 20.1.1, at 20-5 (1981).
111. 397 U.S. at 574.
112. Id. at 575.
113. Id. at 577-79. The Court declared: "Where property is acquired by purchase,
nothing is more clearly part of the process of acquisition than the establishment of a
purchase price. ... [T]he expenses incurred in [the appraisal] litigation were properly
treated as part of the cost of the stock that the taxpayers acquired." Id. at 579. Thus, the
Court held that the "origin of the claim litigated [was] in the process of acquisition it-
self." Id. at 577.
114. 344 U.S. 6 (1952). The "classic" tax benefit rule deals with the recovery of previ-
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commentators observe, Arrowsmith "applies the origin-of-the-
claim doctrine in all cases where the payment is made in a year
subsequent to the original transaction. '" 115 Accordingly, where an
integral relationship exists between the two transactions, the
character of the transaction in the earlier year will color the
character of the transaction in the subsequent year. 1  "The im-
portant connection among the origin of the claim doctrine, the
Arrowsmith tax benefit rule, and the classic tax benefit doctrine
is that two transactions are linked in order to prevent a distor-
tion of taxpayer's income. '' 1
F. The Clear Reflection of Income Test
The "clear reflection of income" standard derives from Code
section 446.11" The standard generally provides that where a tax-
payer's method of accounting clearly reflects income, it is pre-
sumptively controlling of federal income tax treatment."9 The
ously deducted items. I.R.C. § 111.
In Arrowsmith, two shareholder-taxpayers reported the liquidating distributions of a
corporation as capital gains. In 1944, four years after the final distribution of assets, a
judgment was rendered against the corporation and against one of the taxpayers individ-
ually. Each of the two taxpayers paid half of this judgment and deducted 100% of the
amount so paid as an ordinary business loss in his 1944 income tax return. The Supreme
Court held that the losses should be treated as capital losses because the taxpayers'
"liability as transferees was not based on any ordinary business transaction of theirs
apart from the liquidation proceedings." 344 U.S. at 8. Thus, the tax benefit initially
received by the taxpayers-a capital gains deduction-dictated the character of the sub-
sequent deduction (which wag related to the original transaction). See generally Lee &
Murphy, supra note 49, at 499-509.
115. Lee & Murphy, supra note 49, at 504.
116. Id. at 503. Lee and Murphy also maintain that Arrowsmith is applicable "where
the expense does not create or enhance a capital asset, but is integrally related to a
capital transaction and flavored by it because failure to equate the tax character of the
two transactions would result in a distortion of income." Id. at 504. See also Sharples v.
United States, 533 F.2d 550, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
117. Lee & Murphy, supra note 49, at 545.
118. I.R.C. § 446 provides in part:
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-Taxable income shall be computed under the method of
accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in
keeping his books.
(b) ExCEMON.-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the
taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation
of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the
Secretary, does clearly reflect income.
119. See Central Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1984); Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 568 (Ct. Cl.
1970). See generally Note, supra note 8, at 544-49; Note, supra note 9, at 1138-39.
Although the accounting profession and concerned regulatory agencies may support a
particular accounting method that is believed to reflect income accurately, the courts
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Supreme Court has recently endorsed a standard that is based
on "clear reflection of income" principles. In Commissioner v.
Idaho Power Co.,120 the Court declared that "where a taxpayer's
generally accepted method of accounting is made compulsory by
[a] regulatory agency and that method clearly reflects income; it
is almost presumptively controlling of federal income tax conse-
quences."' 1 Without relying on the "separate and distinct as-
set" test of Lincoln Savings,'22 the Court concluded that the de-
preciation expense on equipment used in the construction of
capital assets was a cost that must be capitalized;'23 only
through capitalization would income be "clearly reflected.' 24
Because a major objective of the Internal Revenue Code is to
match expenses against income produced, 25 the "clear reflection
of income" standard would appear to be the most satisfactory
have discretion to accept or reject such a belief. See, e.g., American Auto. Ass'n v. United
States, 367 U.S. 687, 693 (1961) (holding that generally accepted accounting practices are
not binding on the Treasury); Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932)
(holding that agency-imposed accounting rules are not binding upon the Commissioner);
Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814, 817 (4th Cir.) (according some
significance to a company's accounting method), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937).
120. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
121. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See also NCNB Corp. v.
United States, 684 F.2d 285, 292-93 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (holding that current de-
duction of bank branching expenditures accurately reflected income). But cf. Central
Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding
that current deduction of bank branching expenditures did not clearly reflect income).
122. The Court cited Lincoln Savings only for the proposition that agency-imposed
compulsory accounting practices are not irrelevant and may be afforded some signifi-
cance. 418 U.S. at 15; see Note, supra note 8, at 547.
123. 418 U.S. at 13-14, 19.
124. Id. at 14 ("[Tlhis capitalization prevents the distortion of income that would
otherwise occur if depreciation properly allocable to asset acquisition were deducted
from gross income currently realized."). In Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970), the court concluded that some costs that are capital
in nature need not be capitalized if income will still be clearly reflected. Id. at 573; Note,
supra note 8, at 545. The Supreme Court in Idaho Power seemingly rejected this conten-
tion when it stated: "The purpose of § 263 is to reflect the basic principle that a capital
expenditure may not be deducted from current income." 418 U.S. at 16; see also Ency-
clopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1982)
("[E]xpenses, whatever their character, must be capitalized if they are incurred in creat-
ing a capital asset .... "). But as one commentator noted:
By applying "clear reflection of income" principles in Idaho Power, the Court
apparently acknowledged the generalization that capital expenditures may not
be immediately deducted, because in almost all cases income will be clearly re-
flected only by correlating the deduction with the future production of income.
But the Court's reliance on income-reflecting principles itself implies that a cost
ordinarily characterized as a capital expenditure might be treated as immedi-
ately deductible if, as in Cincinnati Railway, the circumstances of the industry
and of the individual taxpayer ensure that income will still be clearly reflected.
Note, supra note 8, at 548 (emphasis in original).
125. See supra note 8; see also 1 B. BrrrKER, supra note 110, 20.4.1, at 20-64 to -66.
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method for distinguishing capital expenditures from ordinary
business expenses.12 6  As one commentator argues,
"[C]apitalization of an expenditure should be required only
where capitalization is necessary to reflect income accurately." '127
Nevertheless, the "clear reflection of income" standard does not
provide an adequate means, in and of itself, to distinguish be-
tween capital and ordinary expenditures. A court remains faced
with the problem of determining whether or not income is being
accurately reflected by a taxpayer's accounting method. In order
to make this determination, and to provide taxpayers with a set
of concrete guidelines for classification,2 8 a more objective stan-
dard is necessary.
II. A UNIVERSAL STANDARD FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
CAPITAL AND ORDINARY EXPENDITURES
For over fifty years, the feasibility of a universal standard for
distinguishing nondeductible capital expenditures from cur-
rently deductible trade or business expenses has been an issue of
controversy in both judicial opinion and legal discourse. 12 9 Al-
though the "separate and distinct asset" test of Lincoln Savings
comes close to being a universal standard, courts have not ap-
plied it in such a manner.130 Furthermore, the test is not deter-
minative of all capitalization issues.131 A universal standard that
(1) can be applied to any expenditure; (2) promotes the objec-
tives of the Tax Code by matching expenses against income; and
(3) clarifies and simplifies the confused state of the law on the
issue, appears below.
126. See Note, supra note 8, at 571.
127. Id. at 548.
128. Such guidelines are necessary to add predictability and uniformity to the tax
treatment of expenditures. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) ("One struggles in vain
for any verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the
statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply
the answer to the riddle."); NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 287 (4th Cir.
1982) (en banc) ("[N]either courts nor the accounting profession have devised a univer-
sal, foolproof method of distinguishing current expenses from capital costs."); Gunn,
supra note 49, at 497 ("A danger more subtle than that of decision by labeling is that of
attempting to devise all-inclusive definitions of concepts such as 'property' or 'asset.' ");
Note, Income Tax Accounting: Business Expense or Capital Outlay, 47 HARV. L. REv.
669, 677 (1934) ("To deduce a uniform criterion of capital and expense consistent with
both the cases and the accounting authorities seems impossible.").
130. See supra notes 12 & 83 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 83 & 116.
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A. Justification for Reform
Uniformity of decision among the circuits is vitally important
on issues concerning the administration and construction of the
tax laws.1 31 Underlying this principle is the idea that inconsis-
tent application of the law by the various circuits is harmful to
the taxpayer. For example, in order to know whether a certain
expenditure is currently deductible or must be capitalized, tax-
payers need concrete, uniform standards to apply. As the Second
Circuit declared in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner:3-3
"The taxpayer, who may be exposed to interest and penalties for
guessing wrong, is entitled to reasonably clear criteria or stan-
dards to let him know what his rights and duties are. 1' 34 In the
absence of "clear criteria," predictability of tax treatment, an
important consideration for business planning and strategy, is
jeopardized.1 35
A further complication that can arise from inconsistent appli-
cation of the tax law is forum shopping. Taxpayers are assuredly
motivated by different concerns in their desire to expense or
capitalize an expenditure. For example, a corporation with a net
operating loss for the tax year may desire to capitalize an ex-
penditure rather than take a deduction that would not provide
any current tax benefits.3 6 Alternatively, a corporation with un-
usually high net income for the tax year but with relatively few
current deductions might desire to expense as much as possible.
The existence of diverse or inconsistent line-drawing criteria for
distinguishing capital expenditures from ordinary business ex-
penses would lead taxpayers to forum shop on the basis of which
circuit would provide the desired result. 37 Given the variety of
132. See Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting North
Am. Life & Cas. Co. v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 1976)); Federal Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 527 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Sha-
piro, 178 F.2d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1949).
133. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
134. Id. at 785.
135. See Lee & Murphy, supra note 49, at 546 ("Predictability in tax matters is im-
portant. Definite, set rules enhance predictability.").
136. Of course, the ability to carry forward or to carry back a net operating loss could
change this motivation. See I.R.C. § 172.
137. The general harms of forum shopping include unequal protection of the law and
a lack of uniformity in the administration of the law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 75 (1937) (considering the problem of forum shopping between state and federal
courts in diversity of citizenship actions). Forum shopping in the context of divergent
capital/ordinary line-drawing standards prevents similarly situated taxpayers from re-
ceiving equal protection of the tax laws (uniform tax treatment).
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line-drawing standards that courts apply in the area, 3' and the
importance of predictability and uniformity in tax administra-
tion, a universal standard for distinguishing capital from ordi-
nary expenditures is clearly desirable.
B. An Amendment to the Internal Revenue Code
SECTION 263A. 39 DISTINGUISHING CAPITAL EX-
PENDITURES FROM ORDINARY AND NECESSARY
BUSINESS EXPENSES.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-An expenditure proximately re-
lated to the creation, improvement, acquisition, or dis-
position of any asset must be capitalized.
(b) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
(1) PROXIMATELY RELATED.-The expression "proxi-
mately related" means intimately connected in
circumstance.
(2) IMPROVEMENT.-The term "improvement" re-
fers to any enhancement or increase in value that
provides a future benefit beyond the taxable year.
(3) ASSET.-The term "asset" means any tangible
or intangible property interest that:
(A) embodies a probable future economic
benefit that involves a capacity, singly or in
combination with other assets, to contribute
directly or indirectly to future net cash in-
flows; and
(B) a particular taxpayer can obtain and
control others' access to the benefit.
(c) EXCEPTIONS.-The exceptions noted in sections
263(a)(1)(A)-(H) and sections 263(b)-(h) shall also ap-
ply for purposes of this section. 140
138. See supra notes 22-128 and accompanying text. Because the standards are not
completely independent, the courts can also apply many combinations of line-drawing
criteria. See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(applying the "separate and distinct asset" test, the new business/old business test, and
the "clear reflection of income" test, to conclude that bank branching expenditures were
currently deductible).
139. Section 263B would be an appropriate section number if the proposed § 263A of
the Tax Reform Act of 1985, supra note 16, is eventually enacted into law. See infra
note 179.
140. Subsection (c) was included to assure that the exceptions to capitalization in
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C. Explanation and Analysis of the Proposed Standard1 4 1
A major objective of the proposed amendment is to match ex-
penses against revenues so as to reflect income clearly and accu-
rately. 4" Basing the standard on a definition of "capital ex-
penditure" rather than "ordinary business expense" most
appropriately accomplishes this objective because "section 162
[ordinary] expenses can be defined only by referring to the defi-
nition of section 263 capital expenditures."' 4' The specific lan-
guage embodied in the proposed amendment, if applied consis-
tently by the courts, should both prevent any distortion of
income due to mismatching, and provide taxpayers with a pre-
dictable and uniform standard for the tax treatment of
expenditures.
Subsection (a) of the amendment provides a general rule for
the capitalization of expenditures. This rule employs language
from several judicially adopted standards that purport to distin-
guish capital expenditures from ordinary business expenses. 4
The heart of the proposed amendment, however, lies in the
three terms defined in subsection (b). 45
1. "Proximately Related"- The principle that expenditures
that are "proximately related" to a capital transaction should be
capitalized derives from the origin-of-the-claim doctrine. e46
Cases decided under this doctrine generally hold that litigation
I.R.C. § 263, many of which have significant public policy objectives, would not be super-
seded by the proposed amendment.
141. To promote consistent application of the proposed amendment among the cir-
cuits, this section should be utilized as a basis for any interpretive Treasury regulations.
142. See supra note 8.
143. Note, supra note 8, at 543 ("The provisions are, in effect, two sides of the same
coin: definition of one implies definition of the other. The search for a useful standard
must therefore turn to the meaning of the term 'capital expenditure.' ").
144. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971)
("creation" of a separate and distinct asset); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572,
575 (1970) ("costs incurred in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset"); Illinois
Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1926) ("[Ilmprovements ...
are additions to capital investment which should not be applied against current
earnings.").
145. Note that "creation," "acquisition," and "disposition" are not defined. These
terms should be taken in their usual and customary business sense.
146. See Lee & Murphy, supra note 49, at 494-96. The definition provided in subsec-
tion (b)(1), however, is not derived from an origin-of-the-claim case. See Southern Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 1230 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ("[Eixpenditures ...
intimately related to, and connected with, the acquisition of a capital asset are to be
treated as part of the cost of or investment in the asset."); Perlmutter v. Commissioner,
44 T.C. 382, 403 (1965) (expenses incurred "in connection with" the acquisition of a
capital asset must be capitalized), aff'd, 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967).
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expenditures incurred "as a direct result of""' or "in connection
with" 148 a capital transaction must be capitalized.1 49 This analy-
sis, however, can apply to any expenditure, not just litigation
expenses. Thus, if an expenditure is "intimately connected in
circumstance"1 60 to a capital transaction,1 51 it should be capital-
ized. An expenditure that is not deemed to be proximately re-
lated to a capital transaction should be currently deducted to
avoid a distortion of income. 1 2
2. "Improvement"- The definition of "improvement" con-
tained in the proposed amendment prevents the capitalization of
repair expenses that do not provide a future benefit to the tax-
payer. 53 Only those expenditures that increase the economic
value of an asset to the taxpayer for periods beyond the taxable
year must be capitalized. Any expenditure that extends the life
of an asset, replaces an existing asset, or adapts an asset to a
new or different use should be deemed to increase the asset's
economic value.' 5 4
3. "Asset"- Underlying the entire framework for reform in
the distinction between capital expenditures and ordinary busi-
ness expenses is the definition of an "asset." The definition of-
fered in subsection (b)(3) of the proposed amendment combines
both judicial and accounting conceptions of an asset. In Briar-
cliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,'" the court recognized that
a contribution to an intangible asset could qualify as a capital
expenditure. 156 The Briarcliff requirement that an intangible as-
set have an "ascertainable and measurable value" before capital-
147. Munn v. United States, 455 F.2d 1028, 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
148. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (W.D. Mo.
1972), aff'd in unpub. opinion, 505 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1974).
149. See supra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
150. For purposes of clarification, this definition should be contrasted with the re-
quirement that an expenditure be intimately connected in time and circumstance. If an
expenditure is "proximately related" to a capital transaction, it should be capitalized,
notwithstanding the fact that the original transaction occurred years ago. The character
of the transaction, or circumstance, is the significant factor.
151. A "capital transaction" would be defined as "the creation, improvement, acquisi-
tion, or disposition" of an asset.
152. Courts are not unfamiliar with applying a "proximate relation" standard in the
tax area. See Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1945); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.212-1(d) (1957); 1 B. BrrTKER, supra note 110, T 20.5.2, at 20-102 to -106.
153. See generally Tress. Reg. §§ 1.162-4, 1.263(a)-l(b) (1958); Lee & Murphy, supra
note 49, at 527-44; Note, Repairs Expense Versus Capital Expenditures, 13 TAX L. REV.
231 (1958).
154. See Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1926); Lee
& Murphy, supra note 49, at 528.
155. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
156. Id. at 784-85. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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ization will be permitted is not incorporated in the proposed
amendment, however, because "there is no reason why measura-
bility in terms of dollar value should determine whether a cost
must be capitalized. ' 15 7 Any expenditure proximately related to
the creation, improvement, acquisition, or disposition of an in-
tangible asset must be capitalized, assuming the conditions set
forth in subsection (b)(3) are met. Of course, if the expenditure
or the intangible asset has an indeterminable useful life, then no
depreciation or amortization of the capitalized expense will be
permitted. 158 The idea that a taxpayer must have a "property
interest" in an item for it to be classified as an asset derives
from Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association,159
where the Supreme Court held that the presence of a property
interest in an FSLIC Secondary Reserve provided significant ev-
idence that a premium paid into the Reserve by the taxpayer
should be capitalized.60
The two conditions set forth in subsection (b)(3) are borrowed
from Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 3, Ele-
ments of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises.'6 ' The
accounting profession's conception of an asset is most suitable
for assuring a proper matching of expenses and revenues, i.e., a
"clear reflection of income.'1 2 Consequently, a "probable future
economic benefit" is the key descriptive phrase of the definition.
"Probable" is included in the definition to acknowledge that
"business and economic activities occur in an environment char-
acterized by uncertainty in which few outcomes are certain,"'63
not to describe a criterion for capitalization. "Future economic
benefit" refers to the fact that "[an asset has the capacity to
serve the enterprise by being exchanged for something else of
157. Gunn, supra note 49, at 498. See also supra note 62.
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956). See also Note, supra note 8, at 539 n.18. The
proposed amendment must be read in conjunction with all Tax Code provisions and
regulations.
159. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
160. Id. at 355-56. General property law should be invoked to determine whether a
"property interest" exists.
161. 1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (FASB), ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS-ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AS OF JUNE 1, 1982, at 3080, 3089 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as FASB1.
162. An important principle of financial accounting is that expenses incurred in the
generation of revenue should be matched with that revenue during the same fiscal pe-
riod. See H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING--INTRODUCTORY 103-04
(G. Johnson & J. Gentry 8th ed. 1980).
163. FASB, supra note 161, at 3088 n.9. "Probable" refers to that which can reasona-
bly be expected or believed on the basis of available evidence or logic but is neither
certain nor proved. Id. (citing WEaSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 1132 (2d college ed. 1972)).
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value to the enterprise, by being used to produce something of
value to the enterprise, or by being used to settle its liabili-
ties.' 64 Thus, rights to receive services of other entities for spec-
ified or determinable future periods can be assets of particular
business enterprises because future liabilities will be reduced;
accordingly, future net cash inflows will be indirectly
increased. 65
Subsection (b)(3)(B) indicates that "a business enterprise
must control future economic benefit to the extent that it can
benefit from the asset and can deny or regulate access to that
benefit by others.116 6 For example, permitting access only at a
price would qualify as control.167 "The enterprise having [control
of] an asset is the one that can exchange it, use it to produce
goods or services, exact a price for others' use of it, use it to
settle liabilities, hold it, or perhaps distribute it to owners. 168
III. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
AMENDMENT' 6 9
Application of the proposed universal standard for distin-
guishing between capital expenditures and ordinary business ex-
penses entails a four-step process. First, a court must determine
whether the expenditure in question is proximately related to
the creation of an asset.170 To make this determination, the
court should apply subsection (b)(3) to ascertain whether an as-
set is involved. If the court concludes that an asset is being or
has been created, it must then decide if the expenditure is prox-
imately related to this creation. If it is, the expenditure should
be capitalized in order to "clearly reflect income." The second,
third, and fourth steps of the process involve substitution of the
164. FASB, supra note 161, at 3107-08. "The most obvious evidence of future eco-
nomic benefit is a market price." Id.
165. Id. at 3089. Prepaid insurance or rent are examples of such assets. It should be
noted that "legal enforceabilty of a right is not an indispensible prerequisite for an en-
terprise to have an asset if the enterprise otherwise will probably obtain the future eco-
nomic benefit involved." Id. at 3110.
166. Id. at 3109.
167. Id. "[G]eneral access to things such as clean air or water resulting from environ-
mental laws or requirements cannot qualify as assets of individual [taxpayers], even if
the [taxpayer] incurred costs to help clean up the environment." Id. at 3110. On the
other hand, clean air it provides in a laboratory or water it provides in a storage tank are
future economic benefits that can be controlled by the taxpayer. Id.
168. Id. at 3109.
169. See supra note 141.
170. See supra note 145.
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terms "improvement," "acquisition," and "disposition," respec-
tively, for "creation" in the above inquiries. 17 1 The determina-
tion under any one of the four steps that an expenditure should
be capitalized is dispositive of the issue; no further steps need be
applied. This process may be illustrated by the following general
examples:
Example (1). X Corporation entered an agreement to merge
with Y Corporation and under state law became obligated to
purchase at its "real value" the stock of those minority share-
holders dissenting from the merger plan. Taxpayers A, B, and C,
minority stockholders of X Corporation, dissented from the
merger and incurred legal expenses in connection with litigation
to appraise the value of their shares. Because the litigation ex-
penses are proximately related to the disposition of an asset (the
minority's stock), capitalization is required. 172
Example (2). Taxpayer, a furniture moving and storage com-
pany, sustained a casualty loss during the taxable year when its
warehouse was totally destroyed by a fire. To preserve goodwill
among its customers, and to protect its business reputation, the
taxpayer reimbursed its uninsured customers whose household
goods were destroyed during the fire. Because the restitution
payments are proximately related to the preservation of an asset
(goodwill),'17 rather than to the creation, improvement, acquisi-
171. Thus, the second step would be to determine whether the expenditure in ques-
tion is proximately related to the improvement of an asset. If the court concludes that an
asset is being or has been improved, it must then decide if the expenditure is proxi-
mately related to this improvement.
172. See Third Nat'l Bank v. United States, 427 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding
that appraisal litigation expenses had to be capitalized because they were incurred in the
disposition of the taxpayer's stock). See generally 1 B. BrrrKER, supra note 110, 1 20.4.2,
at 20-72 to -73.
173. "Goodwill" is "that element of value which inheres in the fixed and favorable
consideration of customers, arising from an established and well-known and well-con-
ducted business." Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 164-65
(1915). It is "a valuable property right derived from a business's reputation for quality
and service." Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Clairol,
Inc. v. Boston Discount Center of Berkley, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114, 1121 n.9 (6th Cir. 1979);
Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1926) ("Good will is
property of an intangible nature, and the term 'property' includes good win.... It may
be bought and sold in connection [with a continuing business] as an incident thereof."),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
Goodwill clearly qualifies as an "asset" within subsection (b)(3) of the proposed uni-
versal standard: (1) it embodies a probable future economic benefit that involves a ca-
pacity to contribute indirectly to future net cash inflows. See North Clackamas Commu-
nity Hosp. v. Harris, 664 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Goodwill ... represents the
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tion, or disposition of an asset, capitalization is inappropriate.
The payments should be currently deducted.'74
Example (3). Taxpayer, a meat-packing corporation, lined the
walls and floor of its basement with concrete to protect it from
the seepage of oil spilled on the ground by a neighboring refin-
ery. The purpose of the expenditure for the concrete liner was to
permit continued use of the basement for normal operations
(storage and curing). Because the expenditure did not enhance
or increase in value any asset of the taxpayer, but merely kept
the meat-packing plant in ordinarily efficient operating condi-
tion, 75 capitalization is inappropriate. 76
Example (4). Assume the same facts as in example (3) except
that the purpose of the concrete lining was to extend the useful
capacity to earn profits in excess of the normal rate of return due to establishment of a
favorable community reputation and consumer identification of the business name.");
General Television, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Minn. 1978)
("[G]oodwill is seen as a self-regenerating asset whose economic value fluctuates but does
not necessarily diminish."), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979); and (2) it is inherent in
goodwill's characterization as a "property right" that a taxpayer can control others' ac-
cess to the economic benefit.
174. See Rev. Rul. 76-203, 1976-1 C.B. 45 (holding that expenditures made to pre-
serve goodwill are ordinary and necessary business expenses deductible under Code
§ 162(a)). See generally 1 B. BirrKEra, supra note 110, 1 20.4.7, at 20-86 to -87.
Under the proposed standard, an expenditure that is proximately related to the crea-
tion, improvement, acquisition, or disposition of goodwill would have to be capitalized.
Of course, if the useful life of the expenditure-the length of time that a benefit will
accrue-cannot be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, no depreciation allowance will
be permitted. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956). Although the Treasury regulations specifi-
cally provide that "[n]o deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill,"
id., a depreciation allowance should be permitted for an expenditure that results in the
creation of goodwill for a limited and ascertainable length of time. Cf. Alabama Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 635, 655 (1969) (holding that ad-
vertising costs involving expenditures for physical assets with ascertainable useful lives
had to be capitalized'and depreciated over five years, despite the possible long-term im-
pact on goodwill).
A strict application of the proposed universal standard to advertising expenses that
result in the creation of goodwill requires the capitalization of such expenditures. The
Internal Revenue Service, however, has long acquiesced in the deduction of advertising
costs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2) (1965) ("Expenditures for institutional or 'good
will' advertising which keeps the taxpayer's name before the public are generally deduct-
ible as ordinary and necessary business expenses provided the expenditures are related
to the patronage the taxpayer might reasonably expect in the future."). Professor Bittker
suggests that the Service's acquiescence in the deduction of advertising expenditures
may have been implicitly ratified by congressional silence. 1 B. BITTKER, supra note 110,
20.4.5, at 20-84. Because the proposed universal standard must be read in conjunction
with all Code provisions and regulations, advertising expenditures to create goodwill
should generally be treated as currently deductible.
175. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958).
176. See Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950) (holding
SPRING 1986] Capital Expenditures
lives of the basement floor and walls, which had been deteriorat-
ing over the past several months due to normal wear and tear.
Because the expenditure increased the economic value of the
taxpayer's basement, an asset that contributes indirectly to net
cash inflows, capitalization is required.1"
The remainder of this Note is devoted to an application of the
proposed universal standard to two controversial expenditures:
prepublication expenses of authors and publishers, and bank
branching expenses. 178
A. Prepublication Expenses of Authors and Publishers179
Prepublication expenditures include research, travel, editorial,
and office costs, in addition to the expenses associated with the
that the expenditure for oil-proofing the taxpayer's basement walls and floor was essen-
tially a repair and as such was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense).
177. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. See generally 1 B. BtrrKER, supra
note 110, 1 20.4.8, at 20-88 to -93.
178. See supra note 13.
179. The issue of whether prepublication expenses should be capitalized or expensed
could become moot if § 905 of the Tax Reform Act of 1985, supra note 16, is enacted
into law. Section 905 amends the Internal Revenue Code by inserting the following new
section after § 263:
SEC. 263A. CAPrrALIZATION OF CERTAIN EXPENSES WHERE TAXPAYER PRODUCES
PROPERTY.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-In the case of any taxpayer who produces real or tangible
personal property, the following costs shall be capitalized:
(i) the direct costs of such production, and
(2) such production's proper share of those indirect costs (including
taxes) part or all of which are assignable to such production.
(f) PRODUcTiON.-For purposes of this section-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The term "produce" includes construct, manufac-
ture, develop, improve, raise, or grow.
(2) TREATMENT OF PROPERTY PRODUCED UNDER CONTRACT FOR THE
TAXPAYER.-The taxpayer shall be treated as producing any property
produced for the taxpayer; except that only costs paid or incurred by
the taxpayer (whether under such contract or otherwise) shall be taken
into account in applying subsection (a) to the taxpayer.
The House Ways and Means Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1985, H.R.
REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 625 (1985), declared in regard to § 905: "[Ijn order to
more accurately reflect income and make the income tax system more neutral, a single,
comprehensive set of rules should govern the capitalization of production costs for all
tangible property, subject to appropriate exceptions where application of the rules might
be unduly burdensome." Although the Committee Report did not explicitly state that
prepublication expenses of authors and publishers would be covered by § 905, this can be
inferred from the "reasons for change" given by the committee, id., and by the language
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final manufacture of the product.' ° These costs are all incurred
in the production of a book, an income-producing asset with a
useful life beyond the taxable year.' 81 In both Faura v. Commis-
sioner'8 2 and Snyder v. United States,8 ' prepublication expend-
itures of an author were held to be currently deductible ordinary
business expenses. 84 The decisions were based on an established
line of precedent'8" and on an analysis of section 2119 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976.186 However, in Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Inc. v. Commissioner,8 7 the Seventh Circuit denied a current
deduction for prepublication costs, relying instead on the "clear
reflection of income" principles of Idaho Power.8 8 Because the
taxpayer incurred prepublication expenses for the creation of a
book "intended to yield . . income over a period of years," the
court had "no doubt" that they were capital expenditures.'89 An
application of the proposed universal standard to the prepubli-
cation expenditures incurred in Faura, Snyder, and Encyclopae-
dia Britannica, also leads to the conclusion that capitalization is
of the amendment. See also S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 140, 1542-51 (1986)
(Senate Finance Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1986). The Senate Fi-
nance Committee version of proposed § 263A is substantially the same as the House
version. Id.*at 1542-48.
180. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 560-71; Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, § 2119(c), 90 Stat. 1520, 1912 [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Act of 1976].
181. See Note, supra note 8, at 537.
182. 73 T.C. 849 (1980).
183. 674 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1982).
184. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 555-56. Cf. Hadley v Commissioner, No.
18277-82 (T.C. Apr. 28, 1986) (holding that prepublication expenditures of an author are
subject to the capitalization requirements of I.R.C. § 280); Garrison v. Commissioner,
No. 23172-83, slip op. at 5 (T.C. Apr. 22, 1986) ("[Section 280] provides that, in the case
of an individual, amounts attributable to the production of a book are required to be
capitalized and deducted over the life of the income stream generated from the produc-
tion activity.").
185. See 73 T.C. at 852-57.
186. Section 2119 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 180, addresses regula-
tions relating to the tax treatment of certain prepublication expenses of publishers. The
Faura court decided to extend the provision to the expenses incurred by authors. 73
T.C. at 859, 862. The Snyder court merely relied on the Faura decision, rather than
analyzing the applicability of § 2119. 674 F.2d at 1365.
187. 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982).
188. Id. at 214. See also Note, supra note 8, at 556-57. For a discussion of Idaho
Power, see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
189. 685 F.2d at 214. See generally Limberg & Lightner, Despite Contrary Author-
ity, Prepublication Costs May Still Be Treated Favorably, 63 J. TAX'N 82 (1985). The
expenditures at issue in Encyclopaedia Britannica were payments made, under contract,
to another company to do all the necessary research work and to prepare and edit a
natural science dictionary. Subsection (f)(2) of proposed § 263A of the Tax Reform Act
of 1985, supra note 179, could possibly be applied to these expenditures to require
capitalization.
Capital Expenditures
appropriate. First, under subsection (b)(3) of the standard, a
book would be classified as an asset to an author or publisher
because it -embodies a "probable future economic benefit.' 9 0
Furthermore, it seems clear that the purpose of prepublication
expenditures is the creation of a book. Because prepublication
expenses are "intimately connected in circumstance" to the cre-
ation of a specific asset, they must be capitalized in order to re-
flect income clearly.
B. Bank Branching Expenditures
In NCNB Corp. v. United States,'9' the Fourth Circuit al-
lowed a bank to currently deduct the costs of starting up new
branch offices. 92 The court reasoned that the expenditures were
incurred to expand an existing business rather than to acquire a
"separate and distinct asset."'193 Because the court believed that
the expansion was necessary for NCNB to maintain its position
in the banking industry, the expenditures were held deductible
under Code section 162.194 In Central Texas Savings & Loan As-
sociation v. United States,"5 a case with essentially the same
facts as NCNB, the Fifth Circuit held that expenditures in-
curred in investigating and opening new bank branches had to
be capitalized. 19' The court concluded that the branches were
"separate and distinct assets" within the meaning of Lincoln
Savings, 97 basing its conclusion on the existence of operating
permits granted to Central Texas by the Savings and Loan Com-
missioner of Texas. 98 Whether the bank branching expenditures
considered in NCNB and Central Texas would be classified as
190. The other conditions set forth in subsection (b)(3) are met as well: (1) an author
or publisher has a tangible property interest in a book; (2) the book's probable future
economic benefit involves a capacity to contribute directly to future net cash inflows
(through royalty payments to an author or book sales to a publisher); and (3) the tax-
payer can control access to the benefit (through a copyright).
191. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
192. For a discussion of NCNB, see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. See
also Fischer, Circuit Courts Split on Deductibility of Bank Costs of Starting Up a New
Branch, 15 TAX ADVISER 546 (1984).
193. 684 F.2d at 290.
194. Id.
195. 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
196. For a discussion of Central Texas, see supra notes 70-78 and accompanying
text.
197. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
198. 731 F.2d at 1182, 1185. The court believed that the permits gave Central Texas
an easily valued property interest in the branch offices. Id. at 1185.
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capital expenditures under the proposed universal standard de-
pends upon the classification of a bank branch under subsection
(b)(3). A branch office would be deemed an asset under this sub-
section if it embodied a probable future economic benefit with a
capacity to contribute to future net cash inflows. The NCNB
court apparently believed that branch offices were needed to
maintain the bank's competitive position rather than increase
its future net revenues. 99 Ultimately, the question as to whether
a bank branch is intended to increase future net cash inflows is
one of fact.20 If the bank branch is deemed to be an "asset"
within the meaning of subsection (b)(3), it seems clear that in-
vestigatory and pre-operating expenditures would be proxi-
mately related to the creation of a specific asset, thus requiring
capitalization.
CONCLUSION
The multitude of line-drawing criteria developed by courts to
distinguish between capital expenditures and ordinary business
expenses has resulted in a great deal of confusion and inconsis-
tency in tax treatment. To enhance predictability of treatment
and uniformity of application among the circuits, a universal
capitalization standard is necessary. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes once remarked, "[T]he tendency of the law must always
be to narrow the field of uncertainty. ' 20 1 Only through a univer-
sal capitalization standard will the existing uncertainty in the
tax treatment of expenditures be eliminated. The standard pro-
posed by this Note reduces confusion and inconsistency by pro-
viding clear guidelines for both courts and taxpayers. More im-
portantly, these guidelines will result in a "clear reflection of
income" if properly applied to an expenditure.
-Steven J. Greene
199. 684 F.2d at 290.
200. It is a difficult task to identify whether the purpose of a particular business
undertaking is to increase income, maintain the level of income, or maintain growth in
income. If the purpose is to increase or maintain growth in income, the expenditures that
are proximately related to the undertaking should be classified under the proposed stan-
dard as capital expenditures; the business undertaking would be considered as resulting
in the creation of an asset within the meaning of subsection (b)(3) because future net
cash inflows are desired.
201. O.W HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
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